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Both the White Paper, The New NHS, and the later consultation document, A National 
Framework for Assessing Performance, stress the need to develop new instruments to tackle 
inefficiency in the NHS.  Among these instruments it has been proposed to benchmark Trusts, 
and by association Health Authorities, using Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) costs. The 
NHS Executive has published plans for a system of ‘Reference Costs’ that will itemise the cost 
of every treatment in every Trust.  These reference costs will be derived from costing HRGs and 
are to be used for many purposes: benchmarking cost improvement, measuring relative 
efficiency, identifying best practice, funding transfers and costing health improvement 
programmes.  This paper examines the construction of reference costs, considers incentives to 
use the information appropriately and asks whether a single accounting construct, the costed 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
 
Both the White Paper, The New NHS (NHSE 1997), and the consultation paper on performance 
(NHSE 1998a) stress the importance of finding better measures of performance for the Health 
Service than the long criticised Purchaser Efficiency Index: 
 
The Purchaser Efficiency Index simply failed to reflect the breadth of what is important in the NHS and 
created perverse incentives which ran counter to the real priorities for the health service.  The balance 
needs to be shifted so that due weight is given to the things that really matter to patients and the public - 
the cost and quality of care the NHS delivers and the benefit patients get from their treatment (NHSE 
1998a p3). 
 
A range of performance measures has been proposed, most of which will be used to assess 
Health Authorities (NHSE 1998a). Among these there is to be a set of Reference Costs intended 
to summarise the efficiency of the hospital sector and, when aggregated over all the providers 
used by a Health Authority, to assess the efficiency of the Health Authority  itself. Reference 
costs were heralded in the White Paper (NHSE 1997): 
 
the Government will develop a national schedule of 'reference costs' which will itemise what individual 
treatments across the NHS cost.  By requiring NHS Trusts to publish and benchmark their own costs on 
the same basis, the new arrangements will give Health Authorities, Primary Care Groups and the NHS 
Executive a strong lever with which to tackle inefficiency (NHSE 1997 p19). 
 
These reference costs will be based on costed Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) and will be 
published in three formats (NHSE1998b): 
1. A comprehensive list of the costs of every treatment offered by every NHS Trust in England. 
2. The National Schedule of Reference Costs (NSRC): which will provide summary statistics 
(mean, range, inter-quartile range) from all Trusts for each HRG, probably by method of 
admission. 
3. The National Reference Cost Index (NRCI): which will report the weighted average of all 
HRG costs in a Trust relative to the national average. 
 
If efficiency measures based on costed HRGs are to be central to the new system, we need to be 
clear  precisely what aspects of health care efficiency are better understood by availability of 
this costing information.  As information itself does not lead directly to change, we need to 
examine incentives to use information on HRG costs and whether attempts to use this 
information to regulate behaviour in the NHS are likely to lead to perverse,  beneficial or 
neutral outcomes. 




The paper is organised as follows.  In Section II we examine the main purposes for which 
comparative cost information is generally used in health care systems.  In Section III we set out 
the principles behind the proposed technique for determining the cost of individual treatments 
described using HRGs.  Section IV considers the main strategies Trusts might pursue to 
improve their league table position while Section V assesses the intended uses of the schedule.  
In Section VI we offer our conclusions and suggestions as to how the system might be 
developed.   CHE Discussion Paper 161   
 
 3
II   THE ROLE OF COSTING EXERCISES 
 
Information on the comparative cost of different health care providers is used in a variety of 




•internal management or central monitoring.   
 





The most common use of comparative cost data is as part of rate setting for remuneration of 
providers of services.  This is basically a form of price regulation but, in setting prices, some 
information on costs is directly taken into account or implied.  Yardstick competition was 
originally considered as a means of regulating the prices of local monopoly utilities.  The 
objective was to provide incentives for firms to operate efficiently and this was to be advanced 
by having the regulator set the prices a firm could charge by reference to the costs of the other 
firms in the industry.  Since these prices were independent of the firm's own costs, there were 
incentives to reduce costs as any resulting surplus could be retained as profit. 
 
In 1980s the US government, concerned about escalating health care costs, applied this model 
to the health sector when it introduced a system of prospective payment for hospital services 
delivered to Medicare patients.  Each patient discharged was assigned a diagnosis-related group 
(DRG) code according to either initial diagnosis or primary procedure (Fetter et al 1980).  A 
price was set for each DRG episode of care based on the average amount charged by all 
hospitals for the treatment concerned, with hospitals generally using financial accounting 
models to determine their charges.  These models, the best known being the Yale Cost Model 
(Freeman et al 1986), allocate costs on the basis of DRG-specific service weights rather than by 
reference to actual patterns of resource use of patients within a DRG. 
 
Techniques for setting DRG related prices to resource use rather than to charges have been 
developed in Australia where the data is used as part of the system of hospital remuneration. In 
1993 the Australian state of Victoria introduced funding arrangements according to which 
public hospitals are reimbursed a casemix weighted payment for each public patient treated 
(Duckett 1995). Patients are classified according to Australian National DRGs (AN-DRGs), 




AN-DRGs on the basis of their principal diagnosis, type of procedure, presence of complication 
and co-morbidities, age, birth weight, and discharge status, these being factors which explain 
use of resources in treatment or which justify the length of acute stay. 
 
Each AN-DRG has an associated resource weight, based on information derived from patient 
level costing systems operating in Victorian hospitals (Jackson et al, 1993; Jackson et al 1994; 
Jackson et al 1998). These systems aggregate information from departmental cost centres 
which collect comprehensive patient level data about the intermediate products - the diagnostic 
tests, radiology, nursing care, operating theatre procedures, etc - provided during the admission. 
Each product has an associated cost weight, assigned according to relative value scales, most of 
which derive from studies undertaken in each hospital. For example, in many sites nursing costs 
are calculated using ward specific patient level dependency systems, which use the results of 
time and motion studies to detail the amount and type of nursing time required by patients 
during each shift. Costs are then assigned to individual patients according to the number of 
shifts spent at each dependency level on a particular ward.  Overheads such as infection control, 
sterile supply and domestic services are incorporated into the cost of producing intermediate 
products, after departmental shares have been determined using step down methods or 
simultaneous equations. This approach results in a higher degree of accuracy than can be 
realised if costs were assigned assuming average resource use for patients grouped together in 
some way. 
 
Hospitals in Victoria are now reimbursed predominately on the basis of the number and type of 
patients treated, although funds are also provided for activities such as teaching or to sustain 
rural hospitals. The AN-DRG system allows funders to vary payments to hospitals according to 
their levels of activity. Also because payment rates are regularly updated and determined on the 
basis of whichever is the efficient hospital in each particular AN-DRG, hospitals have an 
incentive to continually seek efficiency improvements. Further details of the payment system, 





A second use of cost information is found in countries where purchasers of health care 
(insurance companies or health authorities) have some freedom to decide which providers to 
use.  Here comparative cost information, if obtainable, may be used by purchasers in 
negotiating contracts. 
 
Information on variations in treatment costs across providers is of primary use to a purchaser 
who is in a position to move virtually all of their activity from one Trust to another.  While in 
the UK this applies to general practice fundholders, it is rarely the case that a Health Authority   CHE Discussion Paper 161   
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is able to shift main contracts.  This suggests that for the bulk of health care purchasing in the 
UK, comparative cost information is of limited relevance. It is of little value being told that 
other Trusts produce similar services at lower cost if the purchaser has no opportunity to 
redirect activity in order to take advantage of the situation. 
 
If there is excess capacity, comparative cost/price information may be of more use.  In the 
United States, purchasers (health care plans) are often in a position to negotiate charges with 
providers.  Some regulators collate information from published price lists to help inform 
purchasers.  Examples include the Illinois Cost Containment Council documents which publish, 
for each hospital in each region of the state of Illinois, the quoted price for each of the top 10 
DRGs in terms of admissions.
1 
   
 
Internal Management and Central Monitoring 
 
A third demand for comparative cost information has come from management consultants and 
cost accountants who have popularised the idea of cost benchmarking as a tool for managers to 
use when attempting to improve the competitive position of their firm. Benchmarking has 
become so fashionable a term that it is used in a variety of ways to describe quite different 
activities.  In some cases it is used simply to describe comparison itself: e.g. my defect rate 
compared to the industry average.  In other cases the term refers to establishing what 
economists call an 'efficiency frontier' (Barrow and Wagstaff 1989): given data on all producers, 
what are the lowest feasible capital and labour inputs capable of producing particular levels of 
standardised outputs?  One can then identify the difference between a single firm's use of inputs 
and the current industry best practice. 
 
But benchmarking can be a more proactive process than comparison alone. The idea is that the 
management of a firm engaged in a benchmarking process will attempt to: 
 
1.identify an indicator of industry wide 'best practice' (lowest price, lowest cost, lowest defect 
rate, whatever is of interest); 
2.identify the organisational structure or production processes used by the firm(s) achieving 
best practice; 
3. establish whether it would be feasible to import into their own firm the structure or 
production processes associated with best practice; 
4.find ways to implement change. 
                                                           
 
1  Copies of all these reports can be obtained from the Illinois Health Care Cost Containment Council web site: 




A recent survey of benchmarking activity in UK organisations characterised the range of 
meanings for the term benchmarking as starting with the simple ‘indicator’ or league table 
benchmarking (simple comparison) and ending with ‘ideas’ benchmarking (identifying and 
implementing best practice) (Mayle et al 1998).  The results of the study show most UK activity 
is of the indicator/league table variety with relatively little concern with adoption of best 
practice.  One explanation is that implementing change is a much more difficult and 
idiosyncratic exercise than identifying differences. 
 
The government appears to stress identification and implementation of best practice and sees 
purchasers as having an active role in the process.  It is intended that publication of comparative 
cost information will "give Health Authorities, Primary Care Groups and the NHS Executive a 
strong lever with which to tackle inefficiency" (NHSE 1997). Since 1994 Trusts have been 
required to undertake a rolling programme of costing activity below specialty level. However, 
in only two Regions (Northern and Yorkshire, and North West) have these data been collated 
from all Trusts and made publicly available.  The difference the new system will make is that all 
commissioners will now know something about treatment costs throughout the country and can 
compare these data with the amounts they pay for particular services . The policy presumption 
is that this increase in the availability of cost information creates incentives for Trusts to change 
the way they use resources, perhaps under pressure from their purchasers. It will be easier to 
understand the incentives created by publication of information on costs if we first examine the 
data and processes used to generate the information.   CHE Discussion Paper 161   
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III   COST AND OUTPUT MEASUREMENT IN THE UK 
 
 
To be a valid comparative index, a reference costing schedule must be standardised on three 
bases:  
 
•the means of describing units of activity; 
•the method for classifying patients into comparable groups; and  
•the approach to determining treatment costs for each group.   
 
 
Hospital Activity: Finished Consultant Episodes 
 
The NHS is unusual in its approach to measuring the activities of the hospital sector. Most 
countries express inpatient activity in terms of the number of patients admitted to or discharged 
(including deaths) from hospital, so that a unit of hospital activity is said to have been provided 
when the patient's stay in hospital is complete.  In contrast, since 1988/89 the NHS has 
decomposed the hospital stay to reflect the number of consultants assuming responsibility for 
the patient. When the patient is discharged from the care of the consultant (or specialty) a 
completed unit of activity is said to have been provided. This may not correspond with the 
patient being discharged from hospital. The time between a consultant assuming responsibility 
for a patient to discharging the patient from hospital or transferring responsibility to a colleague 
is called a Finished Consultant Episode (FCE). Because a patient may receive care from various 
consultants during any particular spell in hospital, if NHS activity is measured using FCEs 
higher levels of activity will be apparent than if the number of discharges and deaths were used. 
 
While this counting method makes international comparisons difficult, it also complicates 
comparison of hospital activity in the NHS both over time and across institutions. Comparisons 
over time are made difficult because of the possibility of 'episode inflation' whereby the number 
of recorded episodes increases at a faster rate than the number of discharges and deaths. This 
problem may have been further compounded by the introduction of the internal market and the 
use of FCEs as the currency for contracts between health authorities and hospitals. These 
changes have created incentives for providers to record as many episodes as possible, however 
short they may be. Further, the Purchaser Efficiency Index, designed to encourage health 
authorities to secure non-funded increases in activity from the hospitals with which they 
contract, expresses desirable activity increases in terms of FCEs. Hospitals could claim activity 
improvements by simply coding internal transfers more completely. 




Cross-sectional comparisons using FCEs are compromised by the amount of local discretion 
over what constitutes a completed episode. The implications of using FCEs as the basis for 
comparative cost assessment are recognised in the documentation material accompanying the 
software for version 3 HRGs: 
 
one hospital may count the admission from A&E as one FCE, the transfer to medical ward as another, 
and the transfer to surgery for a gastroscopy and then back to the medical ward as two further FCEs; 
another hospital may class all these internal transfers as one FCE. Needless to say the resource use 
allocated to the one FCE in the second hospital will be much higher than any of the individual FCEs in 
the first hospital (National Casemix Office 1997, p21). 
 
In the consultation document on reference costs this problem is recognized and it is proposed 
that by the second year of publication HRG costs will be based on aggregating FCEs into 
‘provider spells’ (NHSE 1998b).  This change is likely to be welcomed but it does create 
aggregation problems because of the current absence of a unique patient identifier with which 




Casemix: Healthcare Resource Groups 
 
The second important condition for accurate cost comparison is that casemix complexity is 
adequately accounted for. It is difficult to force hospitals to accept they are relatively inefficient 
without first establishing that their patients are either no different from those treated elsewhere 
or that differences have been accounted for in determining relative performance. This implies 
that not only should hospital activity be described in terms of cases treated, but allowance 
should be made for differences in casemix complexity. If two hospitals are similar in all 
respects with the exception that one treats a higher proportion of patients with acute myocardial 
infarction and a lower proportion with varicose veins then the costs of the hospitals will differ. 
In order to take account of cost differences which are patient related rather than a reflection of 
the hospital's efficiency, some means is required of describing (groups of) patients according to 
their expected use of hospital resources. 
 
The proposal to “itemise the cost of individual treatments across the NHS” (NHSE 1997) will 
entail defining individual treatments in terms of HRGs. HRGs are groups of inpatient FCEs 
which are purported to have similar health care resource requirements and efforts to encourage 
their use in the contracting process was first signalled in 1994 (EL(94)51). HRGs are a locally 
modified version of DRGs, first developed in the United States (Fetter et al 1980). The National 
                                                           
 
2  See Benton et al (1998) for a description of the approach being used by the National Casemix Office to 
aggregate FCEs into spells.   CHE Discussion Paper 161   
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Casemix Office has been developing HRGs in the UK, and the third version was released in 
May 1997 (Benton et al, forthcoming). The main criteria for local modification and subsequent 
refinement of HRGs are: 
 
•clinical meaningfulness; 
•based on items in the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) dataset; 
•similar resource use; 
•relatively few (not more than fifty per specialty).   
 
The application of these criteria has been instrumental in determining the extent to which HRGs 
can be considered valid descriptions of casemix. Great emphasis has been placed on satisfying 
the first criteria, and much of the development work has been based around clinical working 
groups comprising clinical representatives from each relevant specialty. 
 
HRGs are formed from routine data about inpatients and day cases recorded in the HES dataset. 
The clinical working groups are asked to indicate which types of information recorded in the 
dataset should be used in the refinement process, the aim being to improve the amount of 
within-group homogeneity in the length of stay of patients classified to the same HRG. This 
may lead to recommendations that the presence of secondary diagnoses, indicating 
complications and co-morbidities, should be accounted for, or that an age split should be made. 
These clinical judgments have been statistically tested using 1993/94 data for every patient 
admission for England. 
 
Figure 1 depicts the process by which an FCE is assigned to a HRG. Each individual record in 
the HES dataset is grouped to a single HRG based on the data contained in the record. Where 
information in any field required for grouping is missing or invalid the FCE will be assigned to 
one of seven 'undefined' groups.  
 
While previous versions have differed, information used for categorisation in version 3 
includes: 
 
•primary and secondary procedures (coded using the Office of Population Censuses and 
Surveys, Version 4). It is hypothesised that the overall cost of a treatment episode is strongly 
influenced by whether or not surgical procedures are conducted. As such, the grouping process 




•undertaken. This allows records to be divided into surgical and medical groupings. If more 
than one procedure appears (up to four procedures can be recorded), assignment is determined 
according to a procedure hierarchy, which assigns a rank (from 0 to 7) to all procedures 
according to 'clinical knowledge' and the relationship with post-operative length of stay. 
primary, subsidiary and secondary diagnoses (coded using the International Classification of 
Diseases, volume 10). Where only minor procedures (ranked 0 or 1) or no procedures are 
recorded, the primary diagnosis is used to determine assignment to HRG. The primary 
diagnosis may be overridden in the event of holiday relief care (HRG S24), chemotherapy 
(HRGs A98-S98), complex elderly cases (defined as patients over 69 with two or more major 
diagnoses but no significant procedures - HRGs A99-S99), and when planned procedures have 
not been performed (HRG S22). If a record indicates more than one of these events assignment 
is based on the strict hierarchy depicted in figure 1. 
 
  in some instances, generally where minor procedures are recorded, length of stay is also 
used as a grouping variable to distinguish patients admitted for only a minor procedure 
from those having the procedure as part of a wider treatment course. 
 
  age which separates older from younger patients, although a three way split is 
occasionally applied. The age groups are divided at 17, 50 or 70 years. Occasionally 
gender is used. 
 
  secondary diagnoses are used to identify the presence of complications and 
co-morbidities, this information being invoked, often in conjunction with age splits, to 
subdivide 120 HRGs. 
 
  discharge method (alive or dead) which is used only when grouping neonates and 
pulmonary embolus; and 
 
  legal status, which indicates whether patients admitted to a psychiatric facility were 
compulsorily detained and is used to subdivide three psychiatric groupings 
(schizophreniform psychoses; mania; and depression). 
 
As well as restricting the type of information available for grouping, reliance on the HES 
dataset has meant that attempts to reduce within group variance has focussed on explaining 
length of stay as a proxy for cost, this being the only information vaguely related to resource use 
routinely available, although occasionally it has been supplemented by other types of 
information and clinical judgment (Sanderson et al 1995; Benton et al forthcoming). Even the 
procedure hierarchy, designed to ensure that the most 'resource intensive' procedures are used 




between the procedure and post-operative length of stay. This approach contrasts with the 
considerably more accurate individual resource data available to inform the development of 
AN-DRGs and their associated cost weights in Australia. 
 
Use of length of stay data to determine groupings is not peculiar to the UK (the original version 
of US DRGs relied on the same (Fetter et al 1980)) but strong assumptions must be made about 
the extent to which length of stay and cost are correlated.  Where the correlation is weak, HRGs 
will poorly reflect casemix complexity. For example, a number of HRGs are formed by 
subdividing patients on the basis of age, because older patients (generally over 69 years) tend to 
be hospitalised for longer than their younger counterparts for the same condition. However, 
their longer hospitalisation might be explained by greater difficulty in making discharge 
arrangements rather than their having greater care requirements. If so, the marginal resource 
implications of such delays may be minimal and it may not be appropriate to assume that a 
hospital treating a higher proportion of elderly patients in HRGs with an age split has a 
substantially more resource intensive casemix. 
 
Costs and cost allocation guidelines 
 
The third requirement of a reference cost schedule is for ‘costs’ to reflect resource use. The 
NHS lags behind many other countries in terms of the routine cost data collected by health care 
providers.  This reflects the historically loose relationship between hospital budgets and activity 
and the absence of a significant private insurance sector requiring a detailed itemisation of 
resource use for billing purposes.  Even the introduction of the internal market failed to generate 
patient related costing information. 
 
In contrast to public sector hospitals in countries like Australia, where recording systems make 
it easy to determine the type and quantity of resources used by any patient during their 
hospitalisation, even basic data about the number of diagnostic tests, theatre time or nursing 
dependency are very difficult and extremely time consuming to obtain in the NHS.  Trusts 
rarely have automated information about the resources used by particular patients during their 
hospital stay.  Because hospitals do not collect and record data on the use of resources by 
individual patients, almost all costing in the UK is undertaken on a 'top down' basis. 
 
This top down process of allocating costs starts with collection of the annual financial returns of 
a hospital. These contain information on how much was spent on electricity, maintenance of 
buildings, catering, drugs, salaries, etc.  This expenditure is then reallocated to 'patient 
treatment services': wards, operating theatre, pharmacy, etc.  This reallocation may be direct, 
such as wages for the number of nurses normally staffing a particular ward; or indirect, for 
example operating theatres may be allocated a proportion of the cost of hospital cleaning 
corresponding to their share of total hospital area.   CHE Discussion Paper 161   
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These costs, once allocated to patient treatment services, are then reallocated to specialties: 
paediatrics, general medicine, general surgery, etc.  Again, this reallocation may be direct, as 
where a ward only houses patients in one specialty, or indirect, where the proportion of 
operating theatre time booked by a specialty is used to determine the share of operating theatre 
costs apportioned to that specialty. 
 
Once each specialty has been assigned its share of total hospital expenditure, the specialty total 
is divided by the number of bed days occupied by patients coded to that specialty.  This process 
is the basis for calculating what is essentially the accounting cost of an HRG.
3 
 
In moving from the allocation of hospital costs by specialty to the sub-division of specialty 
costs by HRG, a ‘care profile’ may be constructed by a working group made up of clinicians, 
nurses and clinical managers.  The care profile describes the resources expected for a typical 
patient and might include estimates of items such as theatre time, consultant time, radiology, 
significant drugs and consumables. 
 
In general medicine, for example, a relatively simple approach to estimating resource use is 
recommended.  The process of moving from the allocation of hospital costs to general medicine 
to the sub-division of these specialty costs by HRG can be illustrated using data taken from a 
National Casemix Office study (Dredge 1997). The total accounting cost of general medicine is 
divided by occupied bed days in the specialty to derive a cost per bed day: 
 
Total cost of general medicine 
Occupied bed days 
= £210  = 
Average cost per bed day 
of a patient in general 
medicine 
 
The cost per bed day is then multiplied by the number of bed days attributable to the HRG of 
interest to derive total expenditure by HRG. This figure is then divided by the number of FCEs 
assigned to the HRG, to produce the HRG cost per FCE. 
 
HRG bed days * cost per bed day 




As table 1 illustrates, the cost per bed day is assumed not to vary across HRGs within a 
specialty. 
                                                           
 
3  Various sources describe the process of cost allocation recommended by the NHS Steering Group on Costing. 
FDL(97)25 summarises the principles that are set out in some detail in the Costing for Contracting Manual 




Table 1 Cost allocation process 
 
    HRG a16  HRG d25  HRG e38 
 bed  days  456  850  662 
*  average cost per bed day  £210  £210  £210 
÷ number  of  FCEs  68  141  211 
=  average cost per FCE  £1,408  £1,265  £659 
Source: adapted from Dredge (1997) 
 
This example reveals the main mechanisms by which a Trust can improve its position in the 
reference cost league tables. The three most immediate measures are to reduce length of stay, 
increase throughput, or reassess cost allocation procedures. These strategies are discussed in 




   CHE Discussion Paper 161   
 
  15
IV   CLIMBING THE LEAGUE TABLE 
 
 
Having consulted the published list of costed HRGs, a purchaser finds that one of its providers 
reports costs 25% above the lowest cost reported in the National Schedule of Reference Costs 
for that HRG.  The management of  the Health Authority or Primary Care Group will be judged 
partly on the basis of the weighted average of costed HRGs of its providers.  Unless the 
purchaser can get their providers to reduce costs, their own performance looks poor. What 
happens next? 
 
The purchaser is expected to put pressure on or cooperate with the Trust to reduce costs.  There 
are basically two ways a Trust can improve its position in the league table and these two 
responses reflect the sources of variation in the published data.  First, it can invest in more 
administrative support to improve its coding and may decide to change its cost allocation 
procedures.  For example, incomplete clinical notes may mean its patients are assigned to 
relatively less resource intensive HRGs.  Second, it can try to alter clinical behaviour and the 
management of clinical activity.  The most direct way of reducing HRG cost is to increase 
throughput by reducing length of stay and/or treating more patients. 
 
 
Improving the quality of data used for assignment and costing 
 
Coding to the appropriate HRG relies on the accuracy of information recorded in the HES 
dataset. This in turn depends on the ability of medical records staff to interpret clinical notes 
and the extent to which transcription of information is audited and checked.  Increasing the 
accuracy with which support services and the cost of diagnostic procedures are assigned to 
patients using these services requires more information gathering and monitoring.  Devoting 
additional resources to improving the accuracy with which patient treatment is recorded in 
hospital information systems and costs are allocated will increase administrative and 
information and technology costs. 
In the past, hospitals and clinicians in the UK have had little incentive to improve the quality of 
their data collection, let alone report it. In countries like Australia, where reported costs can 
affect hospital income there is a strong incentive to invest in administrative support for 
improving the quality of information: medical records personnel are better paid and 
departments better staffed than in the UK, and Australian hospitals have made greater 
investments in clinical costing systems. 
 
Of course, there is a danger that hospitals will code patients in such a way that they are assigned 




addressing efficiency. There is evidence to suggest hospitals in the US adopted such behaviour 
following the introduction of DRG funding (Ginsberg and Carter 1986). However, if all 
hospitals act similarly and resource weights are revised periodically, the advantages to each 
hospital will not persist beyond the short term. In contrast, the health system will benefit from 
improved information because no hospital will be able to afford to record less completely than 
the rivals against which it is compared. Regulatory controls can also be introduced to limit 
coding inaccuracies. For example, the Victorian Department of Health and Community 
Services undertakes a random audit of 1% of medical records to measure the accuracy of coding, 
provide advice on coding conventions and to reduce the extent to which casemix payments are 
subject to gaming (Health and Community Services 1994; Duckett 1994). 
 
UK hospitals may be less likely to respond in the way of their US and Australian counterparts. 
Unless their income, rather than merely their position in a league table, is directly linked to 
accurate data, it is unlikely that hospitals in the UK will invest in improved data quality, 




The White Paper emphasises the government's desire to abandon the Purchaser Efficiency 
Index which was criticised for, among other things, providing incentives to increase hospital 
based activity (inpatient and day case) relative to other services (Appleby 1996a).  The index 
was also blamed for diverting attention from securing improvements in health gain and the 
quality of care.  Neither health gain nor the quality of service come into the estimation of HRG 
costs so the issue is whether use of an index of HRG unit costs is less likely to generate 
incentives for hospital based activity than was use of the Efficiency Index.  
 
As explained in Section III, 'costing' a treatment in an NHS Trust is the application of  a set of 
accountancy rules for allocating fixed and semi-fixed costs by length of stay and, for surgical 
procedures, time in theatres. Aside from improving the quality of the data, the 'cost' of an HRG 
can be reduced by:  
 
1. reducing length of stay and increasing  throughput; and/or  
2. reducing fixed expenditure and thus the cost per occupied bed day. 
 
The first strategy requires a change in clinical practice and this might be realised because the 
NHS Executive will have new powers to reduce variation in clinical practice by requiring more 
general use of treatment guidelines. If the efficiency of purchasers and of Trusts is to be 
assessed by reference to an index of HRG costs, the short-run response is likely to be to 
encourage increased hospital throughput and reduced length of stay.  Because HRGs currently 
do not apply to non-acute and non-hospital based activity it is not immediately obvious that   CHE Discussion Paper 161   
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these short term incentives are very different from the actions encouraged by the existing 
Purchaser Efficiency Index. 
 
Pressure to reduce length of stay has been associated with concern over two problems: cost 
shifting and reduction in quality of care.  A hospital shifts costs on to GPs or the local authority 
if it discharges patients with a higher level of dependency. There is evidence that this occurred 
after the introduction of prospective payment in the US (Kosecoff et al 1990).  If the pressure to 
increase throughput leads to inappropriate early discharge, the result may be increased 
readmission rates (Henderson et al 1989). The proposed publication of readmission rates may 
help limit such behaviour, but published clinical outcome data are likely to remain less 
comprehensive than those produced by other countries. Of those measures proposed (NHSE 
1998a), only a subset of about six hospital indicators are expected to be made available, at least 
in the short term
4. This compares with 32 indicators currently produced for health districts and 
hospitals in Scotland (Clinical Resource and Audit Group 1994; 1996). It is important that the 
disclosure of further information be encouraged. If more information on clinical outcomes were 
publically available, bad practices might be recognised more quickly. Whistleblowing and 
articles in Private Eye should not be the only means by which disquiet with our public service 
are voiced. 
 
The second approach to reducing reported cost also involves changing clinical practice but, this 
time,  indirectly.  Most costs are labour, primarily nursing, along with diagnostic services, 
facilities management and estate costs.  Given the age of  hospital buildings and equipment,  
case-mix  and ward dependency there may be scope for management to reduce the 'cost' of  
treatments by reducing the use and/or unit cost of these inputs.  Fewer diagnostic services could 
be offered or the assumptions about dependency reviewed to allow reduced nursing costs 
although, as will be seen below, this approach may prove counter-productive. 
 
Economists are ordinarily interested in costs only to the extent they reflect (or fail to reflect) 
opportunity costs and thereby influence decisions that will affect overall economic efficiency.  
Unit costs, calculated in the form of a costed HRG, do not reflect opportunity costs.  They do 
not show what additional resources will be required (or saved) if we increase the number of hip 
replacements by 5% or if we shift the balance between surgical and medical admissions within 
a hospital or between hospitals or if consultants in neurology reduce the number of scans they 
ordinarily require for patients.   
                                                           
 
4  Although not confirmed at the time of writing, the indicators are likely to be: 30-day in hospital perioperative 
mortality by method of admission; 28-day emergency readmissions; discharge home within 56 days of 
admission with fractured neck of femur, by admission method; 30-day in hospital mortality for fractured 
neck of femur, by admission method; discharge home within 56 days following emergency admission for 




Because HRG costs do not reflect opportunity costs care will need to be taken to ensure that use 
of the reference cost schedule does not create incentives for Trusts to avoid what would be 
genuinely efficiency enhancing moves.  For example, suppose technical developments within 
one specialty permit an accelerated move from inpatient to outpatient treatment.  If the Trust 
implemented the new pattern of treatment, all the overheads currently assigned to patient bed 
days in this specialty would have to be reallocated to the other specialties in the Trust.  If the 
buildings and beds previously used to treat these patients can not be disposed of rapidly, the 
costing methodology requires these infrastructure costs be reallocated to all other Trust activity.  
The costs for HRGs in, say, orthopaedics rise because dermatology patients are no longer 
treated as inpatients but as outpatients.  Managers and clinicians may have an incentive to slow 
down the movement from inpatient to outpatient treatment in order to avoid the opprobrium of 
being accused of having become less 'efficient' in the treatment areas where HRG costs have 
risen due to the reallocation of fixed costs. 
 
The type of perverse incentive illustrated here will be present whenever proposals to improve 
patient care involve movement across institutional boundaries.  The movement of patients from 
acute settings will raise the HRG costs of the patients whose treatment remains in the acute unit.  
These problems are inherent in any system of costing that is predominately one of allocating 
fixed and common costs rather than identifying marginal costs.  It is like punching a bean bag: 
the volume is fixed and if you depress it at one point, it pops out at another.
5 
 
                                                           
 
5  This point can be illustrated with an example.  Radiology is ordinarily a cost centre and it is charged out to 
specialties at a price of £X per scan or x-ray to cover total cost.  £X = cost of buildings + equipment + staff 
+ consumables   number of scans performed for all specialties during the year.  Assume consumables are 
20% of the total cost.  If a couple of consultants try to become ‘more efficient’ by reducing the number of 
scans they ask for, the only reduction in inputs used will be the consumables.  80% of  the inputs they 
thought they were saving are still employed in radiology and the costs of these inputs will now be spread 
over fewer scans.  Not only will the consultants who thought they were saving resources find the price they 
are charged for the scans they still use has gone up, consultants in other specialties will find the price they 
are charged for a scan has risen.   CHE Discussion Paper 161   
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V  USING REFERENCE COSTS 
 
 
HRGs costs from all Trusts are to be summarised in three information sets: 
 
1. A comprehensive list of the costs of every treatment offered by every NHS Trust in England. 
 
2. The National Schedule of Reference Costs (NSRC): which will provide summary statistics 
(mean, range, inter-quartile range) from all Trusts for each HRG, by admission type. 
 
3. The National Reference Cost Index (NRCI): which will provide a cost weighted summary 
of activity at Trust level, intended to give an indication of the technical efficiency of each 
hospital. 
 
The consultation document sets out a formidable list of expected uses for reference costs in 
their various formats (NHSE1998b pp3&6): 
 
Purchasers and Providers are to use them: 
•as benchmarks for cost improvement; 
•as indicators of technical efficiency; 
•as a mechanism for identifying sources of inefficiency; 
•as evidence to inform the negotiation of long-term agreements on improving performance; 
•as a means of identifying good practice; 
•in costing local Health Authority wide Health Improvement Programmes.   
 
Ministers and the NHS Executive are to use them: 
•in providing national information for funding transfers; 
•in providing a better measure of efficiency; 
•in ensuring public accountability for the use of NHS resources.   
 
The public and patients are to use them: 
•in assessing the efficiency of the NHS locally. 
 
This array of anticipated use is discussed along lines that reflect relevant economic issues: 
 
1.Can we expect conclusions about relative efficiency to be statistically valid? 
2.  Are the data appropriate for their intended use? 







Can the data used to construct  the NSRC and NRCI ensure that conclusions about the relative 
efficiency of individual Trusts are statistically valid?  Even though the NHS has for the last five 
years provided guidelines for coding patients and allocating costs, large variations in the 
calculated cost per HRG remain.  Table 2 provides an example. 
 
This shows the published prices for four arbitrarily chosen, but fairly common, version 2 HRGs 
quoted by acute providers in the North West Region for 1996/97.  Theoretically, patients in 
these HRGs are expected to be reasonably resource homogenous, so the variation in costs 
among patients should not be substantial and should only reflect differences in the costs 
incurred by different providers to do the same thing.  However, as Table 2 shows, the highest 
price varies from twice to over five time the lowest price quoted by providers for these HRGs.  
Are we to infer that the efficiency of these Trusts differs by as much as the difference in their 
published prices (costs) would suggest? Clearly if the differences stem from variations in 
counting units of activity, deficiencies in casemix measurement, or local interpretation of the 
costing guidelines, such an inference might be misplaced. 
 
Users of the schedule should be made aware that the costs reported by Trusts might arise from 
chance rather than being statistically significant indicators of inefficiency. With there being 565 
HRGs, there is a danger that individual Trusts will see too few cases within a particular HRG to 
produce reliable cost figures.   
 
The consultation document on reference costs recognizes this problem and offers several means 
of reducing its impact. First, it is proposed to exclude from the database “those NHS Trusts 
which undertake a small volume of activity in a given HRG and those HRGs where, nationally, 
there is a small volume of activity” (NHSE 1998b). Second, the interquartile range is to be 
included among the summary statistics as a measure of variation in reported costs. 
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Table 2 Variations in HRG prices 
 
In-patient ECR tariff prices, 1996/97  
HRG Description 
(Version 2)  Specialty 
c26 Mouth and throat 
procedures category 3 
without complications or 
co-morbidities 
ENT  24  671 175 379 1,103 
e44 Varicose veins  General 
Surgery  30  705 244 257 1,281 
h01 primary hip and other 
major joint replacements 
(excluding knee) 
Orthopaedics  30  4,003 695  3,120 6,114 
l31 transurethal resection 
of the prostate >74  Urology  30  1,956 1,139 988  6,481 
Source:  Extra Contractual Referrals: Purchaser Arrangements and Provider Tariffs for 1996/97, 
North West Regional Office 
 
However, reported costs are themselves averages and fail to take account of the variation in 
costs at HRG level within hospitals. It would be preferable to provide confidence intervals 
based on patient level data rather than on information already aggregated at hospital level 
(Goldstein and Spiegelhalter 1996; Appleby 1996b). Third, outlier cases, those with 
exceptionally high lengths of stay for their HRG, are to be trimmed from the returns made by 
Trusts.
6 This results in lower mean costs, as cases in the upper tail of the distribution are 
ignored. 
 
Offsetting these adjustments, the problem of small numbers is exacerbated by the NHS 
Executive's requirement that Trusts subdivide their HRG costs according to admission type and 
specialty (FDL(97)25). This subdivision seems to have developed in response to 
                                                           
 
6  The upper trim point is defined as 1.5 times the interquartile range plus the upper quartile. Because 
data are positively skewed no low trim point is defined, although day case costs are often separately 
quoted. Trimming excludes a limited number of FCEs but a high proportion of inpatient days so 
reconciling HRG unit costs reported in the NRSC back to aggregate expenditure will result in a 
substantial shortfall. Rather than a single score as currently suggested (NHSE 1998b), the NRCI 
should report both trimmed and untrimmed costs because, first, failure to account for trimming 
could, in principle, encourage delayed discharge for patients close to the trimpoint threshold so that 
they are excluded from the trimmed NRCI calculation and, second, it would avoid erroneous 
conclusion being made about hospital efficiency which, in fact, stem from a disproportionate 
volume of outliers. If the proposed single score combines all cases, some means of apportioning 
costs across the patient stay is required, given that the marginal cost of each additional day is likely 




commissioning requirements. With GP fundholders purchasing elective but not emergency care, 
Trusts have traditionally subdivided their HRGs into these categories and quoted separate 
prices for elective and emergency cases. The new Primary Care Groups will be ‘total 
purchasers’ so that the earlier need to separate elective and emergency admissions will 
disappear. If for other reasons the Executive still wants to maintain the separate costing of 
elective and emergency admissions, a reduction in the robustness of their cost comparison data 
will be one of the prices to pay. It would be worth ascertaining to which HRGs admission 
method is an important explanatory factor of cost rather than assuming that a division is 
appropriate for all HRGs.
7  
 
A similar problem arises from the common practice for contracts to be specialty specific. Trusts 
have felt obliged to quote a specialty specific price for each HRG rather than a standard HRG 
price for the Trust as a whole. For example, for the treatment of varicose veins (version 2 HRG 
e44), a Trust in North West Region quotes one price in general surgery (£706), another in 
urology (£794), another in trauma and orthopaedics (£1,040), another in ENT (£422) and yet 
another in gynaecology (£543) (North West Regional Office, 1997). Clearly, for ostensibly the 
same treatment, this variation is counterintuitive (quite apart from it being odd to quote prices in 
some of these specialties!) and is probably nothing to do with differences in actual resource use 
across specialties. Rather the explanation is either to do with differences in the cost allocation 
process by which specialty based bed day costs are derived or to differences in length of stay, 
which may not be systematically related to clinical practice but are random observations from 
small numbers. It is estimated that 65% of specialty HRGs at individual Trust level contain 
between 1 and 9 cases per year (Bates 1996). The cost estimates pertaining to such limited 
samples cannot be expected to be particularly robust. 
 
Assuming we have dealt with problems arising from statistical significance and small numbers, 
there is the issue of whether remaining observed cost differences are likely to be due to factors 
other than the relative efficiency of managers and clinicians.  Economic theory postulates that if 
economies or diseconomies of scale exist, efficient small hospitals will have different unit costs 
from efficient large hospitals.  If economies of scope exist, the minimum cost of producing a 
particular treatment will depend on the set of other treatments provided and hospitals producing 
different service mixes will have different minimum unit costs for each treatment. 
 
The reference cost consultation paper (NHSE 1998b) recognizes there may be sources of cost 
                                                           
 
7  Emergency admissions are more expensive because they require the provider to carry spare capacity 
in order to accommodate stochastic variation in arrivals (Posnett et al 1998). However, this 
consideration does not enter into the costing methodology. If an important factor explaining cost (ie 
length of stay) it could be argued that admission method be used to define HRGs themselves rather 
than for the subdivision to occur subsequently. The NCO rejected using admission method as a 
grouping variable because it is not a patient characteristic and coding is open to manipulation.   CHE Discussion Paper 161   
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difference independent of efficiency and proposes that Trusts be clustered, so that comparison 
is limited to other Trusts within the cluster. Nineteen cluster groups (some of which are further 
subdivided) are suggested in the consultation document, these having been devised by the NHS 
Executive and Audit Commission in previous examinations of performance. Trusts are grouped 
on the basis of: 
1.size; 
2.teaching status; 
3.type of service (acute; children’s; orthopaedic; community; learning disability; mental health; 
or some combination of these); 
4.whether in London or not. 
 
 
With the exception of the latter characteristic (arising mainly because of higher factor costs in 
London), these can be defended on the supposition that, among other things, (dis)economies of 
scale or scope exist. For example, a recent systematic review of the literature on this topic 
suggested at least three distinct groups: hospitals with fewer than  100-200  beds, hospitals with 
more than 600  beds and the rest (Ferguson et al 1997).  
 
Clustering further undermines the problem of small numbers for comparison: in the 
consultation document two clusters contain only five Trusts and one sub-cluster features a 
single hospital (NHSE 1998b). The extent to which clustering is used is a reflection of the 
importance of factors (other than casemix) that are expected to effect costs but which are 
outside the control of management. Unless these factors are accounted for, conclusions about 
the relative efficiency of hospitals will be spurious. Statistical and econometric techniques are 
available to identify the extent to which patient treatment costs in teaching hospitals are likely 
to exceed those in non-teaching hospitals or the extent to which the presence of specialist units 
is likely to raise costs relative to hospitals offering more generalist treatment. If the government 
is to succeed in encouraging people to accept the NSRC or NRCI as valid indicators of relative 
efficiency the techniques used to separate differences in costs attributable to efficiency from 
other sources of cost difference must be robust and transparent. 
 
 
Appropriate for intended use 
 
Three different intended uses for data on reference costs appear in the government's list:  
 
•indicators of where problems may exist; 
•mechanisms for identifying the sources of inefficiency and good practice elsewhere;  





It is unlikely that a single accounting construct like the costed HRG will be appropriate for such 
a diverse set of functions. 
 
The basic economic definition of technical efficiency is that inputs are minimised per unit of 
output of a given quality.
8  If we assume that Trusts are clustered to reflect economies of scale 
and scope, that the main statistical problems have been dealt with, that coding is fairly uniform 
across Trusts, that all interpret the costing guidelines similarly and that we are only interested in 
the existing institutional locus of services, then reference costs should be useful indicators of 
possible differences in the use of inputs.  Whether this difference in use of inputs reflects a 
difference in technical efficiency requires the further assumption that there are negligible 
differences in the quality of care among Trusts. 
 
Economists are understandably uncomfortable with polices that equate lower financial costs 
with higher efficiency.  A treatment with higher financial costs per patient may be more 
cost-effective than an alternative with lower financial costs.  The collection of outcome data 
lags far behind the collection of accounting data and, despite frequent references to the 
importance of quality and appropriateness, the NSRC will not and cannot relate to the 
cost-effectiveness with which resources are used and hence to a central part of the idea of 
technical efficiency.  In the absence of these data the financial league tables are likely to be used 
as if quality were independent of financial cost.  Of course, it may be true that quality is 
independent but there is some concern over creating incentives to respond to financial targets in 
the absence of evidence that quality is unlikely to be affected. However, careful consideration 
must be given as to how best to report quality data alongside cost information. HRGs may not 
be an appropriate level of aggregation at which to report quality data. McKee and Hunter (1995), 
for example, argue that mortality statistics should be reported by stage of the disease, which 
allows a more precise description of diagnosis than HRGs provide. It would be a happy 
coincidence if HRGs, designed to compensate for variations in the expected resource 
requirements of hospital casemix, were also able to account for differences in expected 
outcomes. 
 
The published form of reference costs will not be a useful ‘mechanism’ for identifying sources 
of inefficiency or best practice.  In the absence of information on cost shifting and quality 
measures at HRG level, the ‘lowest’ reported cost cannot be treated as an indication that the 
Trust producing it is the seat of ‘best practice’.  In order to trace the source of any inefficiency, 
the published costs will need to be decomposed.  For example, a Trust with a published NRCI = 
1.3 is reported to be 30% ‘less efficient’ than the national (or cluster) average while a Trust with 
                                                           
 
8  Efficiency in production of a service requires more in that the mix of inputs must, given factor prices, 
minimise cost per unit of output.   CHE Discussion Paper 161   
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NRCI= 0.94 is 6% more efficient than the average.  The first Trust could have the most efficient 
paediatrics department in the country while the second might have the most inefficient 
orthopaedics. 
 
If the NRCI figure is decomposed so that we can identify the orthopaedics problem in the 
‘efficient’ Trust and if  that Trust's orthopaedics HRG costs are themselves decomposed, we 
might find that the ‘inefficiency’ is due to the use of agency nurses.  The published figures will 
neither enable us to identify the source of inefficiency nor determine whether a hospital is 
technically efficient.  What we might expect is that in the process of assembling the data that 
must ultimately be reported for publication of the NSRC and NRCI, Trusts will acquire internal 
information that may help them identify sources of their higher costs.  In this sense, the 
mechanism for identifying possible sources of inefficiency will not be the publicly available 
data on NSRC and NRCI but the information collected locally. 
 
The closest the economics literature comes to discussing efficiency in the way the NSRC and 
NRCI address the issue is in the analysis of ‘x-inefficiency’ (Leibenstein 1966).  The 
assumption is usually that quality is constant but that a degree of monopoly power has 
permitted managerial slack to go unpenalised so that costs are higher than technically feasible 
levels.  Quality and appropriateness are issues for the consumer and the problem of the 
management is ‘merely’ to seek out and implement cost-effective production processes.   The 
problem for the NHS is more complicated because steps to reduce ‘x-inefficiency’ that have the 
consequence of increasing the use of inappropriate treatments or reducing quality will not 
necessarily be obvious to the consumer or regulator.   
 
The one suggested use for reference cost data that is clearly inappropriate is that of financial 
planning and funding transfers.  Health Improvement Programmes (HImPs) are not just to be 
descriptions of existing services but are to set out changes in service delivery designed to 
achieve health goals.  Costing a programme that involves a change in services requires that we 
obtain information on marginal costs, not short-run average costs.  Short-run average costs are 
backward looking, representing investments in capacity that were made in the past.   
Government and the public may want to look backward at how managers and clinicians have 
used the resources at their disposal much as auditing accounts take a backward look at 
stewardship and probity.  However, financial planning, funding of revenue transfers and Health 
Improvement Programmes are all forward looking and require that estimates of marginal cost 
be used in budgeting.  The proposed reference costs, based on short-run average cost, will not 
be particularly suitable for these purposes. 
 
A HImP that includes shifting 30% of maternity services from acute units into the community 




requirements of the programme would have to be estimated by asking how many resources 
would in fact be released by the acute units each year and available for redeployment, and how 
many resources would be required in the community.  The difference is the net cost of the 
programme and would bear very little correspondence to the present accounting cost of HRGs 
in obstetrics.   
 
Similar issues arise if HRG costs are used by the NHS Executive for funding transfers.  The 
government has announced its intention of replacing direct payment for what used to be called 
extra-contractual referrals by ‘budget adjustments’ for the main purchaser of Trusts providing 
these services.  If a Trust located in one Health Authority permanently holds capacity for 
treating patients from another Health Authority, then transferring purchasing power from the 
second HA to the first at a rate that reflects overheads (such as the costed HRG) would be 
appropriate. However if the activity is temporary, as with a waiting list initiative, then the 
funding transfer should be at marginal cost. 
 
 
Incentives to tackle inefficiency  
 
In neither the White Paper nor the consultation document is there discussion of how publishing 
reference costs will "create a strong lever with which to tackle inefficiency".  These documents 
give the impression that the mere availability of information will make ‘high cost’ Trusts seek 
out and change the causes of their inferior performance.  Comparative performance information 
has been available for some time.  The Audit Commission regularly publishes material that 
would enable Trusts to ‘benchmark’ their performance against others.  Trusts that subscribe to 
the CHKS database use confidential information on comparative performance for internal 
management purposes (CHKS Limited 1997).  Such information has also been available to 
purchasers.  What we do not know is why some Trusts act on this information and others do not. 
Nevertheless, it would not be difficult to imagine mechanisms for encouraging providers to 
pursue efficient behaviour. 
 
One possibility would be to provide financial incentives and penalties for Trusts dependent on 
their position in the league table. Previous government policy was based on an expectation that 
purchasers would use comparative cost information to direct more of their resources to 
providers with lower costs but it is unlikely this approach would be favoured by the present 
government.  The mechanism now dubbed ‘name and shame’ relies on embarrassment or loss 
of professional esteem as the incentive to ensure someone else appears at the bottom of any 
performance list that is published. 
 
Another possibility would be a command and control approach where a Trust would be 
instructed to reduce the distance between some of its costed HRGs and the corresponding   CHE Discussion Paper 161   
 
  27
reference costs by a centrally determined figure, say 10% per annum, during the next three 
financial years.  Alternatively the NHS Executive could delegate responsibility to the Health 
Authority for setting the target cost reduction and this would be incorporated into the long-term 
agreements between Primary Care Groups and Trusts.  Recent announcements suggest Trusts 
will be set such targets but we should ask what incentive there is to meet the target or what 
happens to a Trust that fails to meet its target. 
 
To date reported experience with benchmarking in the public sector has concentrated on Next 
Steps Agencies (Samuels 1998) where Chief Executives are given performance targets by 
Ministers and the Chief Executives risk dismissal if they fail to meet targets. If this is the 
incentive intended for Chief Executives (and Chairs) of NHS Trusts and Health Authorities, it 
will be important that targets are set with reference to activity over which Chief Executives 
have control or influence.  If the variation in length of stay that gives rise to the variation in 
HRG cost is due to decisions by clinicians and they are not willing to alter their practice, the 
contracts of consultants protect them from the penalties that can be imposed on managers. 
 
It may be that the main incentive to comply with central directives is the usual one within 
command and control systems: a subordinate unit that fails to satisfy superiors will lose out in 
terms of future resources and the opportunity to undertake utility enhancing activities.  The 
NHS Executive now has more control over major investment by Trusts, and Health Authorities 
have more control over appointment of consultants and developments at specialty level. If a 
Trust with relatively high reported costs in, say, cardiology HRGs fails to meet cost reduction 
targets, the opportunity for clinicians in that specialty to develop and expand their activities 
could be curtailed.  In some areas there is excess capacity in the hospital sector and the 
expectation of major reconfigurations as technology changes.  As with any firm trying to 
protect market share, hospitals or specialties within hospitals will have a strong incentive to 
avoid being labelled one of the weak performers and, therefore, one of the dispensable units. 
 
A drawback of  incentive structures related to ‘industry’ reconfiguration is that the most 
vulnerable are not necessarily the least efficient.  Particularly in the public sector, hospitals with 
political influence and/or good news management can survive threats of being closed or having 




V   CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This paper has attempted to examine how the information on reference costs is to be generated, 
how it is likely to be used and whether the way it is used is likely to contribute to the objective 
of a more efficient NHS. For years individuals concerned with the efficiency and improvement 
of health care services in the NHS have complained of lack of data with which to evaluate the 
performance of this major part of our economy and public sector.  While we applaud the new 
policy of making more information available, it is important that this information is used 
appropriately and that users are aware of its limitations. 
 
It would appear that the government intends the information on reference costs to be used in 
part for all of the functions identified in Section II: remuneration, purchasing, internal 
management and central monitoring.  Purchasers are expected to set targets for improvements 
in cost in their long-term financial agreements with Trusts.  Managers and clinicians are 
expected to ‘benchmark’ their costs and change the way they organise and provide patient 
treatment so as to improve cost performance. What is not clear is whether incentives exist for 
purchasers and providers to change their behaviour in this way.  Recent NHS experience 
suggests purchasers have tended to be weaker than providers and often had difficulty securing 
desired changes in activity.  The creation of Primary Care Groups will further fragment 
purchasers and the encouragement of mergers will further strengthen Trusts.  In view of this it 
may be that the only incentive structure likely to be effective in securing the government's 
desired use of reference costs is one of command and control.  The increased control Health 
Authorities and the Department of Health will have over Trust resources could be used to 
encourage compliance with cost targets. 
 
A problem with the command and control approach is that the data are not sufficiently robust to 
permit a target cost reduction of 10% for one Trust and 25% for another with any confidence 
that the consequences will represent efficiency gains.  The process of generating the data within 
a Trust may well help managers and clinicians better understand the use of resources within 
their organisations but the specific number produced (forty-two?) may not tell us much about 
the efficiency with which health care is produced in one Trust when compared to another.  In 
the absence of Trust specific HRG level data on quality and appropriateness for each HRG 
costed, it is not possible to tell whether the Trust reporting the lowest cost is producing a service 
of roughly the same quality as the Trusts further ‘up’ the schedule of reference costs. Collection 
of information on reference costs may well lead to fruitful discussion at the local level (one of 
the government's aims) but it is unlikely to produce a useful basis for setting targets (also, it 
appears, a government aim). 
 
Comparison is hampered because of variations in the ways that activity is measured and costs   CHE Discussion Paper 161   
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are apportioned across hospitals. At last calls to abandon FCEs as the main counting method 
have been heeded (Clarke and McKee 1992, Radical Statistics Health Group 1995), and the 
introduction of a unique patient identifier will further enhance understanding of activity across 
health sectors. However, the absence of patient level cost information continues to frustrate 
attempts to improve casemix measures, and the application of cost allocation guidance is 
subject to high degree of discretion. 
 
Serious consideration of techniques for identifying the impact on cost of factors other than 
efficiency is required if the resulting efficiency index is to be credible.  If efficiency league 
tables are to become a permanent part of government monitoring of NHS performance, there 
must be investment in producing better quality cost information and the information must be 
generated in a way that permits the average values appearing in the league tables to be 
accompanied by confidence intervals so that users are better able to judge the significance of a 
Trust's position in the table.  This might increase the co-operation of Trusts as the system would 
then appear to be fairer than the proposed form of publication.  It would also help the centre by 
making it easier to identify the genuinely poor or very good performers. 
 
Experience with the system can be expected to help identify solutions to some of these 
problems.  It may be worth examining whether the objective of changing clinical practice 
through cost benchmarking might not be more effectively pursued by using an indicator of 
resource use other than the costed HRG.  As explained in Section III the absence of patient 
related cost data and the desire to minimise resources devoted to collecting cost data in the NHS 
means variations in the cost of a particular HRG are virtually all due to variations in length of 
stay.  Why is so much time and effort being invested in translating length of stay information 
into cost data?  This question would not arise if, as in Victoria, we were collecting details of 
many different resources used by a patient.  Translating this information into standardised 
monetary values is a convenient means of summarising the different dimensions of resource use.  
But where resource use is proxied by a single dimension (length of stay), nothing is gained from 
reporting the measurement units on a different scale (money).  Rather than providing greater 
clarity about variations in practice, it may obscure them for the very people we want to 
influence: clinicians.  Peer group/professional pressure to alter practice may be more effectively 
mobilised if the league tables relate to characteristics of the service recognised to be 
professionally significant.  If it is the managerial model of benchmarking that the government 
wishes to see adopted in the NHS then perhaps we should be benchmarking length of stay 
directly rather than indirectly via reference costs. 




In its various plans for the NHS the government repeats a concern for quality as well as  
efficiency
9 but the way cost data are presented and used will influence whether the quality 
dimension of cost remains obvious and affects interpretation of cost figures.   One possibility 
would be to integrate publication of cost and quality data but the difficulty is that there is very 
little information on quality at the HRG level.  A solution to this problem is to confine 
efficiency measures to the level of the Trust or at least limit disaggregation to the specialty level. 
This would increase the feasibility of matching clinical quality indices with costs.  Little would 
be lost by abandoning the plan to measure efficiency at the highly disaggregated level of the 
HRG.  As argued earlier in this paper, given the data and the nature of costing procedures to be 
used, there is little or nothing that can be inferred about relative efficiency when comparing a 
costed HRG from one Trust with that in another Trust. 
 
We are promised in the White Paper and various consultation documents that the "New" NHS is 
to be distinguished from the "Old" NHS by widening the focus on efficiency to embrace quality.  
A symbol of this is to be abolition of the purchaser efficiency  index with its incentives to 
increase hospital based activity.  Unless care is taken in the way the centre uses the NSRC and 
NRCI, there is a real danger that we will reinstate all the perverse incentives of the purchaser 
efficiency index when we introduce the new efficiency measures.  Given costing methodology, 
the primary way a Trust can improve its NSRC or NRCI performance is by increasing hospital 
based activity.  Much of the hoped for innovation in patient care pathways and new institutional 
settings for health care could be inhibited if the proposed efficiency indicator is given sufficient 
importance in the system of monitoring and setting performance targets that it simply becomes 
the "New" purchaser efficiency index. 
                                                           
 
9  In this context they usually mean ‘financial cost’ when they use the term ‘efficiency’ since it is 
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